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In re WILFORD WRIGHT et al., on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus - Grounds - Evidence.-A writ of habeas 
corpus is not available to attack a flnal judgment on the 
ground that the conviction rests on evidence obtained by an 
illegal ~rch and seizure incident to an unlawful arrest. 
[2] Criminal Law-Double Punishment.-Concurrent sentences for 
. crimes based on one act or indivisible transaction constitute 
mUltiple punishment within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 654, 
proscribing double punishment of a criminal act that consti-
tutes more than one crime. 
[3] Id.-Double Punishment.-Pen. Code, § 654, forbids multiple 
punishment by imposition of the proscribed multiple sen-
[2] See C~.Jur.2d. Criminal Law, §§ 214, 215; Am.Jur.2d. Crimi-
11al Law, § 546 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 26; [2-6] Criminal 
Law, § 1475. 
oj 
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tences, but not multiple convictions, and whether an errone-
ously sentenced defendant actually suffers excessive punish-
ment cannot be the factor that determines whether the section 
is applicable. 
[4] Id.-Double punisbment.-Multiple sentences forbidden by 
Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing double punishment of a criminal 
act that constitutes more than one crime, whether consecutive 
or concurrent, impose excessive punishment beyond the power 
of the sentencing court and can be corrected by habeas corpus. 
(Disapproving PeopZe v . .Anaerson, 75 Cal.App.2d 365, 371 
[~2 P. 906]; People v. Pearson, 41 Cal.App.2d 614, 618 
[107 P.2d 463]; People v. Dallas, 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 604 [109 
P.2d 409]; People v. Benenato, 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 367 [175 
P.2d 296]; People v. McWilliams, 87 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [197 
P.2d 216]; People v. Thompson,13S Cal.App.2d 4,10 [284 P.2d 
39]). ° 
[6] Id.-Double Punishment.-The proper procedure to be fol-
lowed by appellate courts to correct multiple sentences vio-
lative of Pen. Code, § 654, proscribing double punishment of a 
criminal act that constitutes more than one crime, is to elimi-
nate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punish-
able offense insofar as penalty alone is concerned. 
[8] Id.-Double Punishment.-Where concurrent sentences had 
been imposed on defendants who had been convicted of 
kidnaping one victim for the purpose of robbery, and for 
first degree robbery of that victim, and for first degree 
robbery of a second victim, the sentence for the first robbery, 
being less severe than that for the kidnaping, should be 
eliminated; however, the robbery of the second victim, al-
though committed in the course of the same criminal enter-
prise, was an offense against a person other than the victim of 
the kidnaping and therefore was a proper subject of a sepa-
rate sentence. 
PROCEEDINGS in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody after sentences imposed for one kidnaping and two 
robbery convictions. Sentences for one robbery conviction set 
aside; order to show cause discharged and writ denied. 
Wilford Wright and Irving Jackson, in pro. per., and Ar-
thur D. Dempsey, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Petitioners. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., 
Gloria F. DeHart and Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Attorneys 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners were convicted of kidnaping 
Linn Bayliss for the purpose of robbery, first degree robbery 
of Bayliss, and first degree robbery of Joseph Brody. The 
superior court imposed concurrent sentences. Petitioner 
Wright appealed, and the judgment against him was affirmed. 
(People v. Wright (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 866 [31 Cal.Rptr. 
432].) 
[1] Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the ground 
that the convictions rest upon evidence obtained by an illegal 
search and seizure incident to an unlawful arrest. The writ is 
not nvailable to attack a final judgment on this ground. (In re 
Lessard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 497,503 [42 Cal.Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 
39] ; In re Sterling (1965) 63 Cal.2d 486, 487 [47 Cal.Rptr. 
205,407 P.2d 5].) 
The opinion on Wright's appeal (216 Cal.App.2d 866) 
reveals, however, that the kidnaping of Bayliss was part of an 
indivisible course of conduct directed to the objective of 
robbing him. The Attorney General concedes that under Penal 
Code section 6541 petitioners cannot be punished for both the 
kidnaping and the robbery of Bayliss (In re Ward (1966) 64 
Ca1.2d 672, 677 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] ; In re Ponce 
(1966) ante, pp. 341, 342-343 [54 Cal.Rptr. 752, 420 P.2d 
224]) but contends that the concurrent sentences for those 
offenses do not inflict double punishment forbidden by section 
654. In support of this contention the Attorney General 
invokes People v. Kynette (1940) 15 Ca1.2d 731, 762 [104 
P.2d 794], in which this court, in answer to the contention 
that consecutive sentences based on one act violated section 
654, modified the judgment to make the sentences concur-
rent. 
[2] l£he rule that concurrent sentences for crimes based 
on one act or indivisible transaction do not constitute multiple 
punishment (People v. Kynette, supra, 15 Cal.2d at p. 762; 
People v. Sigel (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 279, 285 [130 P.2d 
763]) has been rejected by many decisions, commencing as 
early as People v. Oraig (1941) 17 Ca1.2d 453, 458 [110 P.2d 
403], that modify judgments or reverse them in part to 
remove the effect of such concurrent sentences. (People v. 
Knowles (1950) 35 Ca1.2d 175, 189 [217 P.2d 1] ; People v. 
Logan (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 20] ; other such 
1 Penal Code, section 654: "An act or omission which is made punish-
able in different ways by different provisions of this code may be pun-
ished under either of such provisions, but in no case ean it be punished 
under more than one." 
(J 
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. decisions are cited later herein and in Deering's and 'Vest's 
Annotations to Penal Code section 654.) People v. Quinn 
(1964) 61 Ca1.2d 551,555 [39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705], ex-
plicitly declares that such sentences constitute double punish-
ment. Any effect of Kynette and Sigel as authority to the con-
trary must therefore be deemed to have been dissipated. (See 
People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 756 [39 CalRptr. 
11].) 
Many cases have held that correction of jUdgments impos-
ing concurrent sentences in violation of section 654 was 
necessary to preclude the possibility that the multiple sen-
tences would work a disadvantage to the defendant when the 
Adult Authority considered the fixing of his term and parole 
date. (E.g., People V. Craig, supra, 17 Cal.2d 453, 458; People 
v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Ca12d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 321] ; People v. 
Nor Woods (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 [233P.2d 897] ; People 
v. Brown (1958) 49 Ca1.2d 577, 593 [320 P.2d 5]; In re 
Ponce, supra, ante, pp. 341, 342-343; In re Henry (1966) 
ante, pp. 330, 331-332 [54 Cal. Rptr. 633, 420 P.2d 97]; 
People v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 496 [260 
P.2d 27]; People v. Hawkins (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 
839 [17 CalRptr.'66] ; Adams v. Heinze (1962) 205 Cal.App. 
2d 53, 55 [22 Cal.Rptr. 814].) The Attorney General contends 
that this concern with possible prejudice is unnecessary in a 
case such as the one before us because of the Adult Authori-
ty's policy of basing terms and parole dates not on the 
number of concurrent sentences the prisoner is serving but on 
the total circumstances of the offense and the offender, includ-
ing the possibility of his rehabilitation. (See Comments of Mr. 
Fred R. Dickson, Chairman, Adult Authority, First Sentenc-
ing Institute for Superior Court Judges (1965) 45 Cal.Rptr. 
Appendix 99, 101-102, 114-115; People v. Denne (1956) 141 
Cal.App.2d 499, 507 [297 P.2d 451] ; People v. Logan (1966) 
244 Cal.App.2d 795, 798 [53 Cal.Rptr. 549].) The argu-
ment that violation of the proscription against double punish-
ment may not prejudice a defendant in a particular case, 
however, is not a convincing ground for overruling scores of 
cases holding that the dual sentences should not be allowed to 
stand. 
[3] Section 654 forbids multiple punishment by imposi-
tion of the proscribed multiple sentences, but not multiple 
convictions. (People v. Tideman (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 586 [21 
Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007] ; People v. McFarland (1962) 
58 Ca1.2d 748, 762 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].) Whether 
) 
654 IN RE WRIGHT [650.2<.1 
the erroneously sentenced defendant actually suffers excessive 
punishment cannot be the factor that determines whether the 
section is applicable. In some situations concurrent sentences 
violating section 654 would result in detrimental operation of 
other statutes that govern punishment.2 In other situations, 
particularly misdemeanor convictions, section 654 is applied 
although considerations of possible disadvantage to the 
defendant from the operation of erroneous concurrent sen-
tences cannot be predicted. (See People v. Vargas (1960) 179 
Cal.App.2d Supp. 863 [3 Cal. Rptr. 925] ; People v. William.f 
(1962) 207 Cal.App.2d Supp. 912, 919 [24 Cal.Rptr. 922].) 
Only in cases of improper multiple sentences for felonies that 
include a valid sentence of death can it be said that no useful 
purpose would be served by modifying the jUdgment. (People 
v. Chessman (1951) 38 Ca1.2d 166, 193 [238 P.2d 1001]; 
People v. Smith (1950) 36 Ca1.2d 444, 448 [224 P.2d 719] ; 
People v. Wein (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 383, 409 [326 P.2d 457] ; 
People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 425, 435 [341 P.2d 303] ; 
People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 467, 496 [341 P.2d 
679].) 
[4] The cases cited in the margin,S however, suggest or 
hold that concurrent sentences violating section 654 can be 
. 2For example, erroneous concurrent sentences for first degree robbe17. 
With a minimum term of five years and a maximum of life (Pen. Code, 
§§ 213, 671), and for burglary with explosives, with a minimum term of 
10 years and a maximum of 40 years (Pen. Code, § 464), would prejudice 
defendant by requiring him to serve the longer minimum term for the 
burglary and also permitting the Authority to exact service of the longer 
maximum term for the robbery. 
Under the habitual criminal statute (Pen. Code, § 644) defendant 
~ would be prejudiced by erroneous concurrent sentences for an offense sub-
j~t to a lesser penalty but available to support a determination of ha-
b1'tua1 criminality (e.g., grand theft, with a maximum of 10 years [Pen. 
Code, § 489]) and an offense subject to a greater penalty but not listed 
in the habitual criminal statute (e.g., issuing a check without sufficient 
funds, with a maximum term of 14 years [Pen. Code, § 476a]). 
Erroneous concurrent sentences for petty theft, with a maximum term 
of six months in jail (Pen. Code, § 490), and issuing a check not exceed-
ing $100 without sufficient funds, with a maximum term of one year in 
jail (Pen. Code, § 476a), would be detrimental to a defendant who suf-
fered a subsequent conviction because he would be subject to the in-
creased minimum punishments provided by Penal Code section 666 for 
one who has been previously convicted of petty theft and" served a term 
therefor in any penal institution. ' , . 
apeople v. Anderson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 365, 371 [242 P. 906] ; People 
v. Pearson (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 614, 618 [107 P.2d 463]; People v. 
Dallas (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 604 [109 P.2d 409]; Peopltl v. 
Benenato (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 367 [175 P.2d 296]; People v. 
McWilliams (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [197 P.2d 216]; People v. 
Thomps01t. (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 4, 10 [284 P.2d 39]. 
To the same effoot were People v. Bean. (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 34, 41 
) 
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upheld as working no prejudice. Those suggestions and hold-
ings are disapproved as inconsistent with our decisions that 
multiple sentences forbidden by section 654, whether consecu-
tive or concurrent, impose excessive punishment beyond the 
power of the sentencing court and can be corrected on habeas 
corpus. (Neal v. State of Oalifornia (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 16-
17 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839] ; In re Oruz (1966) 64 
Ca1.2d 178, 181 [49 Cal.Rptr. 289,410 P.2d 825]; In re Ward, 
supra, 64 Cal.2d 672; In re Romano (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 826 [51 
Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798]; In re Ponce, supra, ante, p. 
341; In re Henry, supra, ante, p. 330.) 
The Attorney General further states that our decisions are 
in conflict as to the proper procedure to be followed by appel-
late courts to correct multiple sentences violative of section 
654. He urges that if we refuse to uphold the sentences here 
on either ground advanced by him (that concurrent sentences 
do not inflict double punishment or that they are not prejudi-
cial) then we should suspend execution of one sentence by a 
procedure similar to that of the sentencing court approved 
in People v. Niles, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756.4 
[198 P.2d 379] (disapproved in People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Cal.2d 711, 
115), and People v. Sharp (1922) 58 Cal.App. 637, 639 [209 P. 266] 
(disapproved in People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762). 
4Defendant in the Niles ease was eonvicted of burglary and of a fel-
onious assault committed as an incident to his sole objective of burglary. 
The trial judge sentenced him on both counts but stayed execution on the 
assault count pending any appeal and during service of any term fixed 
by the Adult Authority on the burglary count, the stay to become per-
manent at the completion of service of any sentence for the burglary. 
This procedure was upheld by the appellate eourt. (Accord, People v. 
R08enfield (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 60, 62 [52 Cal.Rptr. 101]; People 
v. Johnson (1966) 242 CaI.App.2d 870, 877 [52 Cal.Rptr. 38]; People 
v. Jenkins (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 928, 934-935[42 Cal.Rptr. 373].) Peo-
pZe v. Hernandez (1966) 242 CaI.App.2d 351, 358-359, 361-362 [51 Cal. 
Rptr. 385], questioned the propriety of the procedure in Niles on the 
ground that the express legislative recognition of the trial court's power 
to stay execution in certain situations justifies the inference that the 
Legislature meant to limit that power to those situations. (In re Collins 
(1908) 8 Cal.App. 367, 369 [97 P. 188].) The Hernandez opinion (242 
Cal.App.2d at pp. 358-359, fn. 1) suggests that the trial court can stay 
execution of sentenee in only two situations, i.e., when probation is 
granted (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.1, 1203a) and when an appeal is taken (Pen. 
Code, §§ 1243, 1467). Suspension of execution of sentence is also author-
ized by statute, however, in the special statutory proceedings for those 
convicted of crime who may be mentally disordered sex offenders. (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, §§ 5500.5, 5501, subd. (a).) 
It is true that a number of California cases declare that "A court 
has no power to suspend a sentence except as an incident to granting 
probation." (Oster v. Municipal Court (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 134, 139 [287 
P.2d 755]; People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 287 [42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 
398 P.2d 391]; see also the other cases cited in the Hernandez opinion; 
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[5] Since People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Ca1.2d 748, 763, 
however, it has been settled that the appropriate procedure at 
the appellate level is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as 
to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone 
is concerned. G 
[6] Of the' two sentences imposed on each petitioner for 
the one course of criminal conduct against Bayliss, that for 
the robbery should be eliminated because it is less severe than 
that for the kidnaping. The robbery of Brody, although 
committed in the course of the same criminal enterprise, was 
an offense against a person other than the victim of the 
kidnaping and therefore is a proper subject of a separate 
sentence. ( Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 20; 
People v. Ridley (1965) 3 Cal.2d 671, 678 [47 Cal. Rptr. 796, 
408 P.2d 124].) 
Judgments, § 345.) Those eases, however, were concerned with suspension 
of sentence as an act of lenience. The essence of their reasoning is that 
since the Legislature has prescribed the method for exercise of such 
lenience in the probation statutes, the trial court cannot suspend sentence 
as an act of grace under some inherent or common law power (see E:c 
parte Slattery (1912) 163 Cal. 176 [124 P. 856]; People v. O'DMnell 
(1918) 31 Cal.App. 192, 191 [114 P. 102]; I'll. re Oolli1t.8, supra, 8 Cal. 
App. 361, 369; but see People v. Patrich (1891) 118 Cal. 332 [50 P. 
425]) and that in a probation situation the court's order suspending its 
sentence must either be interpreted as a grant of probation, however in· 
formal, or if the suspension cannot be so interpreted (as where the court 
denies probation and nevertheless purports to suspend sentence) then the 
order of suspension is void and the sentence is valid. (Oster v. Munioipal-
Oourt, supra, 45 Ca1.2d 134, 139.) 
Although the Legislature has not expressly provided for a stay of exe· 
cution of sentence in the Niles situation, the power to proceed as the trial 
court did in that case is within the fair import of section 654. As the 
appellate court there explained (221 Cal.App.2d at p. 156) that procedure 
reasonably reconciles the policies involved in applying section 654 to pro-
tect the rights of both the state and the defendant • 
. C ISAccord: People v. Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 14 [21 Cal.Rptr. 
429]; People v. Frye (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 199, 803 f32 Cal.Rptr. 699]; 
People v. Bynes (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 268,212, 214 35 Cal.Rptr. 633]; 
People v. Rainey (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 93, 102 [36 Cal.Rptr. 291]; 
People v. Bailey (1964) 221 Cal.App.2d 440, 442, 443 [38 Cal.Rptr. 1181; 
People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 107, 115 [39 Cal.Rptr. 814]; 
People v. Gay (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 102, 105 [40 Cal.Rptr. 118] ; People 
v. Buice (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 324, 341 [40 Cal.Rptr. 811]; People v. 
Alvarado (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 189, 195 [42 Cal.Rptr. 310] j I'll. re 
Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 r 42 Cal.Rptr. 921] j People v. 
Nelson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [43 Cnl.Rptr. 626]; People v. 
Sipult (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 810 r 44 Cal.Rptr. 846] j I'll. re Allen 
(1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 23, 25 [48 Cal.Rptr. 345J; People v. Thomsen 
(1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 84, 91, 98 [48 Ca1.Rptr. 455]; People v. Davia 
(1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 [50 Ca1.Rptr. 215] j People v. Brumley 
(1966) 242 Ca1.App.2d 124, 131 [51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Helms 
(1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 416, 487 [51 Ca1.Rptr. 484]; People v. Remme 
(1966) 243 Ca1.App.2d 618, 621 [52 Ca1.Rptr. 665]. 
As to each petitioner the sentence for robbery of Bayliss is 
set aside. Petitioners are not entitled to release since they are 
held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to 
show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Schauer, 
J.,. and Peek J.,. ~oncurred. 
